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I, INTRODUCTION 
This case concerns the denial of an application for preliminary approval of a 
proposed subdivision known as "Cedar Creek Ranch Estates" by Defendants1 
Respondents Kootenai County and the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the County"). The County filed its Brief of 
Respondents in this appeal with this Court on October 24, 2008. This appeal has not 
yet been set for oral argument as of the date of filing of this Supplemental Brief. 
The Brief of Respondents filed in this case relied significantly on the opinion 
originally issued on June 4, 2008 by this Court in Akers v. Morfensen, Supreme Court 
Docket Nos. 33587 and 33694 (2008 Opinion No. 68)' in its discussion of whether the 
visit by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter "the Board") to the 
property at issue in this case prejudiced any substantial rights of Plaintiffs] 
PetitionersIAppellants John Noble and Cedar Ridge Homes, Inc. (hereinafter "CRH"). 
See Brief of Respondents at 24-30. After this brief and CRH's reply brief were filed, 
however, this Court issued a Substitute Opinion in Akers on January 22, 2009 (2009 
Opinion No. 6). The County then filed a Motion for Leave to Augment Brief pursuant to 
Rule 34(f)(2) of the ldaho Appellate Rules on January 30, 2009. This motion was 
received by this Court on February 2, 2009, and was granted by order dated 
1 Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(f), copies of both 2008 Opinion No. 68 and 2009 Opinion No. 6, as posted to the 
ldaho Supreme Court website (http:llwww.isc.idaho.govlopinions/sccivilhtm), are attached as 
Appendices A and B to this Supplemental Brief, respectively. Page references correspond to the page 
numbers in the attached opinions. 
February 25, 2009. In accordance with the County's motion and the Court's order, this 
Supplemental Brief will be limited to an analysis of the application of the Substitute 
Opinion in Akers to the site visit at issue in this case. 
I I .  SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Board properly conducted its viewing of the subiect property under this 
Court's prior holdings reaarding viewinqs by iudqes or iuries, which should be 
expressly extended to viewinqs conducted by decision-making bodies sittinq in a 
quasi-iudicial capacity. 
One of the County's arguments is that the manner in which the viewing of the 
property at issue in this case (hereinafter "the subject property") was conducted did not 
prejudice any substantial rights of CRH. The County continues to maintain that this 
viewing was conducted in a manner consistent with the guidance provided in this 
Court's prior decisions. While this position has not changed as a result of the issuance 
of the Substitute Opinion issued in Akers, the issuance of that opinion does change the 
analysis which is properly used in applying Akers to this case. 
The original Akers opinion reviewed this Court's prior decisions since 1918 
concerning viewings by juries during the course of trials, and applied those decisions to 
viewings by a judge during the course of a trial to the district court without a jury. See 
Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 at 6-7. This opinion held that viewings of property could not 
themselves constitute evidence on which a decision can be based. Id. at 6 (considering 
viewing of property by a district judge). Rather, such observations were found to be 
"only useful to evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial." Id. at 7. 
The Substitute Opinion in Akers, however, removed the analysis of the trial 
judge's visit to the property at issue in that case which was present in the original 
opinion. Compare Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 5-12 with Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 
at 5-9. Instead, it merely analyzed whether certain of the trial judge's findings were 
based on substantial and competent evidence. Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 8-12. 
Based on that analysis, the Court affirmed some of those findings, and found that the 
trial judge had erred in making certain other findings. Id. 
The Substitute Opinion specifically mentioned that "[tJhe district court examined a 
number of exhibits and personally viewed the property during the trial before concluding 
that the scope of the prescriptive easement was limited to a width of 12.2 feet." Id. at 
12. It also acknowledged that "ItJhe district court found, based on its viewing of the 
property and the record, that the width of the traveled portion of the access road was 
12.2 feet." Id. After reviewing the specific findings and the evidence on which they 
were based, this Court concluded that "the district court's finding is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence," and affirmed the district court's decision on that 
issue. Id. 
Unlike the original Akers opinion, the Substitute Opinion did not analyze the 
propriety of the trial judge's visit to the site. In that opinion, this Court instead appeared 
to acknowledge that the viewing of the property was proper, so long as the ultimate 
decision was based on substantial and competent evidence in the form of trial testimony 
and exhibits admitted during the course of the trial. See Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 4, 
12. This view is consistent with this Court's prior cases concerning site visits performed 
by judges or juries during the course of a trial. 
In Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 ldaho 580, 174 P. 1004 (1918)*, a 
jury instruction regarding a site visit by the jury was challenged on the basis that it 
permitted the jury "to consider as evidence the knowledge obtained from a view of the 
premises." Tyson Creek, 174 P. at 1007. While this Court indicated that it was "very 
doubtful whether the jurors were misled" by the instruction given, it also stated that the 
jury should have been instructed "that they could only use the knowledge obtained by 
their view of the premises in determining the weight and applicability of the evidence 
introduced at the trial, and that a view of the premises does not supply a want of 
evidence, and is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be based." Id. 
In Uhrig v. Coffin, 72 ldaho 271, 240 P.2d 480 (1952), this Court applied the rule 
from Tyson Creek to a viewing conducted by a judge during a court trial. Uhrig, 72 
ldaho at 274, 240 P.2d at 481. In that case, the court stated that while the viewing the 
trial judge conducted "is not a substitute for nor may be considered as evidence, such 
viewing and inspection are to be considered in determinina the weight and applicability 
of the evidence." Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Later, in Lobdell v. State ex re/. Bd. of Highway Directors, 89 ldaho 559, 407 
P.2d 135 (1965),~ this Court recognized that "on a trial of a cause by the court sitting 
2 Tyson Creek was cited in the original Akers opinion. Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 at 6. 
3 Lobdell was also cited in the original Akers opinion. Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 at 6-7. 
without a jury, the court has discretionary power to inspect the premises during the 
course of the trial in order to evaluate and apply the evidence submitted." iobdeli, 89 
ldaho at 567, 407 P.2d at 139. The Court then found that the trial court erred by 
conducting such inspection without notice to the parties. Id. at 567, 407 P.2d at 139-40. 
It cited Tyson Creek and Uhrig in setting forth the proper standard for the consideration 
of such visits, and summarized this standard as follows: 
A view or inspection of the character under consideration is permissible for 
the purpose of enabling the court properly to understand the evidence, 
and properly to apply it. A view may be considered as bearing on the 
credibility of the witnesses who appeared at the trial. It cannot be 
considered as evidence or have the effect of supplying evidence 
independent of, or in addition to, that taken in the course of the trial, or 
supplant evidence adduced, or meet the requirement that proof of 
necessary facts be made. 
Id. at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 139-40 (citing 89 C.J.S. Trial ij 588, at 369-70). 
This Court has previously found that there is no analytical difference between 
such views and viewings conducted by governing boards or hearing bodies acting as in 
a quasi-judicial capacity. See Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 ldaho 
203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 846 (2007) ("When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter 
the governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but 
sits instead in the seat of a judge"). Thus, the rule announced in Tyson Creek, Uh ig  
and iobdell is easily extended to viewings conducted by a decision-making body sitting 
in a quasi-judicial capacity, notwithstanding the removal of this analysis from the 
Substitute Opinion in Akers. Under the Akers Substitute Opinion, a finding may be 
"based on its viewing of the property and the record," so long as the finding is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 12. 
The rule from Tyson Creek, Uhrig and Lobdell allows the use of observations made 
during a viewing to enable the decision-making body to understand and apply the 
evidence already in the record, and to weigh the credibility of testimony, but specifically 
prohibits those observations from being used as a substitute for evidence not in the 
record. See Lobdell, 89 Idaho at 567-68,407 P.2d at 139-40. 
Here, CRH's project engineer, Russ Helgeson, provided a map of the property to 
County staff prior to the site visit in accordance with the Board's decision to leave the 
public hearing open to allow for such submissions and to conduct the site visit. Agency 
Tr. p. 78-79. CRH has contended that Mr. Helgeson should have had the opportunity to 
explain certain markings on that map, and to correlate those markings to flags set at 
various points on the property, during the site visit. See R. p. 40-42; Brief of Appellants 
at 28-33. However, under the authority cited above, this would have been improper 
because the Board could only use the viewing of the subject property to understand and 
apply the evidence already in the record, including the map in question, but could not 
take additional evidence, including any additional testimony Mr. Helgeson may have 
wished to proffer. Therefore, the decision to keep Mr. Helgeson from providing the 
information he wished to provide was not erroneous, and did not deprive CRH of due 
process or any other substantial rights. 
B. The Court should use this occasion to clarify its prior decisions reaardina site 
visits conducted by auasi-judicial bodies. 
The application of this Court's prior holdings regarding judicial viewings to site 
visits conducted by quasi-judicial bodies, including the Substitute Opinion in Akers, still 
necessitates a reexamination of the Court's prior statements specifically concerning 
such viewings. In Comer v. Twin Falls County, 130 ldaho 433, 942 P.2d 557 (1997), 
this Court held that "before a local zoning body, whether it be the Commission or the 
Board, views a parcel of property in question, it must provide notice and the opportunity 
to be present to the parties." Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d at 563. The Court 
quoted another of its prior decisions regarding a jury viewing for the reasons behind this 
holding: 
First, notice to the parties provides them with an opportunity to contest the 
propriety of such a viewing under the particular circumstances .... More 
importantly, notice to the parties provides them with an opportunity to be 
present at the time of the inspection, which in turn will insure that the court 
does not mistakenly view the wrong object or premises. 
Id. (quoting Highbarger v. Thornock, 94 ldaho 829, 831, 498 P.2d 1302, 1304 (1972)). 
This is consistent with this Court's holding in LobdeN with respect to judicial viewings, 
and provides the ability of an applicant or other affected person to object to the viewing 
on the limited basis that the governing board or hearing body mistakenly viewed the 
wrong property. Compare Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d at 563, with Highbarger, 
94 ldaho at 831, 498 P.2d at 1304, and LobdeN, 89 ldaho at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 139- 
40. It is also not inconsistent with the Substitute Opinion in Akers regarding the ability 
to base a decision in part on a viewing as long as there is substantial evidence in the 
record in support of that decision. See Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 12 
Here, CRH has not made the argument that the Board viewed the wrong 
property, and the District Court confirmed that "[tlhere's no indication in the record that 
the county commissioners had, in fact, examined the wrong property, [or] had gone to 
the wrong location." Tr. p. 57. Therefore, no violation of the issue identified in Comer 
occurred. Cf. Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d at 563. 
In addition, in order to properly apply the Substitute Opinion in Akers and this 
Court's prior holdings regarding judicial viewings to site visits conducted by quasi- 
judicial bodies, it is important for the Court to clarify a dictum contained in its opinion in 
Eacref v. Bonner Counfy, 139 ldaho 780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004). In the context of a 
discussion of the factors surrounding the determination as to whether a decision maker 
is biased, the Court stated on the one hand that a "quasi-judicial officer must confine his 
or her decision to the record produced at the public hearing," but then also stated that 
"the opportunity to be present at a view provides opposing parties the opportunity to 
rebut facts derived from the visit that may come to bear on the ultimate decision ... ." 
Eacref, 139 ldaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500 (emphasis added).4 While the former 
in that case, the Court vacated and remanded a decision of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners 
on the basis of statements made by a commissioner who had cast the deciding vote to grant a variance 
which indicated an obvious bias in favor of the applicant. Eacret, 139 ldaho at 784-87, 86 P.3d at 498- 
501. For this reason and because the Court also found that the same commissioner had conducted a 
viewing of the property without notice to the parties which would have afforded them the opportunity to be 
present, the above quote was not necessary to the decision. See id. 
statement is consistent with this Court's prior holdings that a viewing is not evidence but 
instead merely affords the trier of fact the opportunity to apply and evaluate evidence 
already in the record, the latter statement is inconsistent with this holding. Compare id. 
with Lobdell, 89 ldaho at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 140, and Uhrig, 72 Idaho at 274, 240 P.2d 
at 481. If observations made at a site visit are not evidence, how can "facts derived 
from the visit" exist which would be subject to rebuttal? 
This Court should also address the practical effects of applying its prior decisions 
regarding judicial viewings, including the Substitute Opinion in Akers, to site visits by 
quasi-judicial bodies, and the proper conduct of such visits. Do public hearings need to 
remain open for the purpose of a site visit if the observations made during that time are 
not evidence? Are statements made by members of the governing board or hearing 
body during a site visit merely deliberations, or must parties be afforded the opportunity 
to rebut such statements, as Eacret seems to indicate? Must the public hearing be 
continued or re-opened to receive objections that the wrong property was viewed, as 
Comer requires, or may such objections be deemed legal argument and be received 
and decided after the public hearing is closed? 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
This Court's prior decisions regarding judicial viewings, including Tyson Creek, 
Uhrig, Lobdell, Highbarger, and the Substitute Opinion recently issued in Akers, should 
be expressly extended to viewings conducted by decision-making bodies sitting in a 
quasi-judicial capacity. In applying those precedents to this case, the Court should 
reconcile its prior statements in Comer and Eacret so as to require only that before a 
declslon is ultimately made on the application, tne decision-making body must provide 
an opportunity to object to the viewing on the limited basis that the wrong property was 
viewed. The Court should also take this opportunity to address the practical application 
of its precedents, including the Substitute Opinion in Akers and its decision in this case, 
to the conduct of site visits by quasi-judicial decision-making bodies. Finally, in this 
case, the Court should find that the District Court correctly held that conduct of the site 
visit in this case did not violate any substantial rights of CRH because that holding was 
consistent with the Substitute Opinion in Akers and this Court's precedents regarding 
judicial viewings. Cf. Tr. at 55-60. 
Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in the previously filed Brief of 
Respondents, the County reasserts that the decision of the District Court affirming the 
decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. S-842P-06 
should be AFFIRMED. 
Dated this 2yaL day of March, 2009. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
/ 
Patrick M. Braden. Civil Dersutv ' ,  
Attorney for ~efendants l~es~ondents 
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VERNON ,I. MORTENSEN and MART1 E. ) 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
1 
Defendants. ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. f-lonorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court are vacated, and 
the case is remmded. 
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants Mortensen. Terri Yost argued. 
Robert Covington, Mayden, for appellants White, 
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan Weeks 
argued. 
HORTON, Justice 
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute. 
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellants") appeal the district court's judgment 
regarding the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis 
and Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive 
damages for trespass and emotional distress. This Court previously decided an appeal 
concerning this case in Akers 1). D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) 
(Akers I ) .  We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACICGROUND 
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property 
involved in this case: "Government Lot 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property." 
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Government Lot 2 is 
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern 
corner of Goverllment Lot 2 and the southeaster~l corner of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the 
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The 
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The 
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this 
litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective 
properties. 
Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop 
Road Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions 
of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and 
Government Lot 2 do not actually s'hare a border. it is therefore physically impossible to access 
Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other 
property. 
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time of acquisition, a road 
provided access to Parcel A, running through the southern portion of Govermnent Lot 2 and the 
southeastern comer of Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an 
approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east 
to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to 
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road 
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each 
direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach), 
which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop 
Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis, 
over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit. The 
PeplinsltiIAkers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A, 
to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining 
Parcel B, to the Whites. 
In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access 
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes 
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property in Parcel A. Appellants then brought 
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to 
otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and 
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Alters' property and alleged malicious behavior by 
Appellants. 
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence. 
During the trial, the district court personally viewed the access road and propcrty in question. 
The district court confirmed to Appellants an express easement 12.2 feet in width across the 
Alters' property ill Government Lot 2, through the original approach, but not the curved 
approach, to Millsap Loop Road. Although the district court confirmed Appellants' easement 
across part of the Akers' land, the court hund that the easement ended at the western boundary 
of Government Lot 2 and did not cross into the Akers' property in Parcel B. 
The district court also awarded rhe i i ~ e r s  compensatory damages arising fiorn 
Appellants' trespass in the amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. 9 6-202 for 
a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded 
$10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by 
Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers 
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of 
$30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Alters, to 
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06. 
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers 
I This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a 
determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an 
easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and 
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand 
regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights. 
On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied 
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment 
of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusioll of law on its finding 
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a 
second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were 
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was 
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found 
the prescriptive easement passed fiom Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned 
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and atlorney fees 
from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellants timely 
appealed from the district court's order on remand. 
11. STANDARD OP REVIEW 
Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports 
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger 
v. Uerifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488, I29 P.3d 1235, 1237 (2006) (citing Alumei v. sear Lake 
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial 
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment 
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(1990)). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) 
(citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); 
Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); 1.R.C.P 
52(a)). If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 13 1 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998)). This Court will 
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 ldaho at 643, 152 P.3d 
at 4 (citing Bram~x?ll, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the 
question of damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
Trilogy Network Sys,  Inc. v. .Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 11 19, 1121 (2007) (citing 
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 
665 P.2d 1056,1059 (1983)). 
111. ANALYSIS 
Both sides to this appeal ask this Court to finally resolve their dispute. We are unable to 
fulfill their requests. We conclude that the district court's factual findings were based, in part, 
upon irnpermissible reliance on a viewing of the property. Normally, we would remand the case 
to the district court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this 
opinion. However, the parties have displayed a high degree of animosity towards each other and 
the district judgc. We conclude that it is in the best interest of all parties involved, including the 
district judge, to vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial before a different 
district judge. Although this remedy is rarely exercised by this Court, we find it best serves the 
interest of justice. 
A. The district court erred when making factual findings relating to the scope and 
!ocrtion of Appellants' prescriptive easement. 
The district court relied upon its personal on-site view of the subject property to find 
certain facts relating to the scope of Appellants' prescriptive easement. This was error. 
Additionally, the district court's finding regarding the location of the easement on Parcel B was 
not suppo~ted by substantial and competent evidence. 
The district court's finding that Appellants' prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet wide was 
based substantially on its view of the property. The district court specifically found that: 
"[Appellants'] argument that the easement should be 25 feet wide is simply unsupported by the 
record and a view of the premises." Appellants argued that the easement should be 25 feet wide, 
including ditches and shoulders. The district court, however, found that: "The view and the 
exhibits show that not all of the length of the roadway has ditches on either or both sides, nor did 
the view show any consistent 'shoulders."' We conclude that the district court's reliance on its 
site view was error. It is well established in Idaho that the knowledge obtained by a jury view of 
a premises can only be used to determine the weight and applicability of the evidence introduced 
at trial and that a view of the premises "is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be 
based." Tyson Creek R.R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 590, 174 P. 1004, 1007 (1918). 
When construing a prior Idaho statute that permitted a jury to view the premises in question, this 
Court held: "'The purpose of the statute is not to permit the taking of evidence out of coui-t, but 
simply to permit the jury to view the place where the transaction is shown to have occurred, in 
order that they may the better understand the evidence which has been introduced."' Stale v. 
McClurg, SO Idaho 762,796, 300 P. 898, 91 1 (1931) (quoting State v. Main, 37 Idaho 449,459, 
216 P. 731, 734 (1923)). Although these cases involve a viewing of the property by a jury, for 
purposes of appeIIate review, there is no analytical difference between a jury view and a court 
view. The policy underlyil~g this rule of law is clear: the record must reflect the evidence upon 
which the finder of fact made its decision. This Court is simply unable to evaluate the basis of 
factual determinations made upon the basis of a view. 
These rules remained intact when this Court adopted the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1958. Under I.R.C.P. 43(f), during a trial, the court may order that the court or jury may view 
. . "' ' " 2 . L -  .... L-+-."<.:.,, ..,, :,L+ ,,FFA,APJ ,.,, 
a court view in Lobdell v. State ex rel. Bd. of Highway Dir., a case involving an inverse 
condemnation. 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965). In Lobdell, after the judge had viewed the 
property in question, the district court granted an offset to the plaintiff for restoration of access to 
their property that had been limited by curbing constructed by the defendant. Id. at 553, 407 
P.2d at 137. This Court held the district court erred when it entered findings based on the results 
of an examinatiol~ of the premises and noted that an inspection of the premises is only useful to 
evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial. Id. at 567-68,407 P.2d at 139-40. 
Idaho is not alone in adhering to this rule: Bd. of Educ. of Claymont Special Sch. Dist 1). 
13 Acres ofLand in Brandywine Hundred, 131 A.2d 180 (Del. 1957); Dude Counly v. Renedo, 
147 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1962); Derrick v. Rabun County, 129 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 1963); State v. 
Simerlein, 325 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. App. 1975); Guinn v. Iowa & Sf.  L. X. Co., 109 N.W. 209 (Iowa 
1906); State v. Lee, 63 P.2d 135 (Mont. 1936); Stale by State PIightliuy Comm 'r v. Gorga, 149 
A.2d 266 (N.J. 1959); Myra Found. v. US.,  267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959) (applying North 
Dakota law); In re Appropriation of Worth, 183 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1962); Port of Newport v. 
Haydon, 478 P.2d 445 (Or. App  1970); Durika v. Sch. Dist. ofDerry Township, 203 A.2d 474 
(Pa. 1964); Ajootian v. Dir. of Pub. W o r k ,  155 A.2d 244 (R.I. 1959) (stating rule in dicta only); 
Townsend v. State, 43 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1950). 
As previously noted, the district court found that the prescriptive easement turned ninety 
degrees to the south from the access road immediately upon entering Parcel B. This finding was 
not supported by substalltial and competent evidence. The district court found that historically, 
the prescriptive easement "tunled south on to defendants' land" and "'disappeared"' after 
crossing into Parcel B. We have carefully examined the exhibits upoil which both Appellants 
and Respondents rely, as well as those addressed by the district court in its Order on Remand. 
There was tcstimony in the record, offered by Richard Peplinski, that the prescriptive easement 
traveled in a western direction across Parcel B for at least 125 feet before it curved onto his 
property to provide access to a Quonset hut. Although the Alters claim that the evidence on this 
subject is conflicting, we are not so persuaded. The aerial photograph upon which the Akers rely 
clearly shows a roadway resembling a shepherd's crook, extending well east into Parcel B before 
curving back to the soutl~west oward the Quonset hut. The exhibits offered by the Respondeuts 
are similar. All exhibits are consistent with Peplinslci's testimony and reveal that the access road 
traveled east into Parcel B before curving back towards the Quonset hut on Parcel A. For these 
reasons, we find this finding to be clearly erroneous. 
Thc district court erred when it relied on its site view to find the scopc of the easement 
and the district court's finding regarding the location of rhe easement on Parcel B is not based 
upon substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the judgment establishing the location and 
scope of Appellants' easement must be vacated. 
B. The district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages must be vacated. 
The district couri also erred when it reinstated the damage award from Akevs I. That 
damage award was based, in part, upon the district court's view of the premises. The district 
court awarded the Akers trespass damages resulting from Appellants' efforts to improve the road 
on Parcel B. These improvements consisted of excavation and the dumping of fill to provide a 
road base. The district court found that these activities occurred to the west of where it located 
Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. We have determined that the district court's 
factual finding as  to the location of the easement on Parcel B is clearly erroneous. The district 
court specifically found that it had "viewed the area, and qound] such excavation to have 
occurred further to the west of where the road immediately went into what would be the exact 
northeast corner of what is now [Parcel A]." The damage award also compensated the Akers for 
Appellants' trespass outside the scope of Appellants 12.2-foot prescriptive easement across 
Government Lot 2. As indicated above, the district court's finding that the scope of Appellants' 
prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width was based upon the district court's view of the 
premises. Accordingly, the entirety of the trespass damages award must be vacated. 
The district court's determination of damages for emotional distress and its award of 
punitive damages related to conduct by Appellants in the course of that which the district court 
determined to be trespass. As the scope of trespass, if any, will be determined in a new trial, we 
vacate the entire award of compensatory and punitive damages. For the same reason, the district 
court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Akers is vacated. 
C. This matter will be reassigned to a new district judge to conduct a new triai. 
Normally, we would remand the case to the district court for additional findings of fact 
and conclusio~is of law However, given the animosity woven into this case, we find it 
appropriate to remand the case for assignment to a new district judge. In fairness to the district 
judge, and the parties as well, we think it a difficult and uncomfortable task for thc district judge 
to now revisit and re-evaluate the evidence, disregarding his own earlier observations and factual 
determinations, particularly in light of allegations by Appellants that he cannot act i~npartially. 
Although such allegatioi~s rarely warrant reassignment, appellate courts in other jurisdictions 
have found it besr to assign cases to a new trial judge in certain linlited circiiiilstances. See Beck 
v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 485 (Del. 2001); In re Guardianship qf Lienernann, Not Reported in 
N.W.2d, 2004 WL 420158 (Neb. App. 2004); In re Guardianship qfR.G. and F ,  382 A.2d 654, 
658 (N.J. 1977); In re Custody qfA.L.A.P.-G., Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 22234910 (Wash. 
App. 2003). This case is one of the rare i~lstances in which reassignment is appropriate. 
D. Neither party will receive an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
The Akers and the Mortensens have each requested an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
As the Alters have not prevailed in this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
We cannot conclude that the Akers have frivolously defended this appeal. Accordingly, we deny 
the Mortensens' request for an award of attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The judgment is vacated and this case is remanded for a new trial before a different 
judge. Costs to Appellants 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tem 
TROUT, CONCUR. 
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HQRTON, Justice 
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easemenl and lrespass dispute. 
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. 
(hereinafter collecti~rely referred to as "Appellants") appeal the district court's ruling regarding 
the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis and 
Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages for 
trespass and emotional distress. This Court previously decided an appeal concerning this case in 
Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers I). We affirm in 
part and vacate in part the district court's judgment issued after Akers I and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property 
involved in this case: "Government Lo1 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property." 
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Government Lot 2 is 
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern 
corner of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the 
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The 
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The 
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this 
litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective 
properties. 
Govcrnment Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop 
Road. Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions 
of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and 
Government Lot 2 do nor actually sharc a border. It is therefore p11ysical:j; impossible to -- akCCSS 
Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other 
property. 
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time o.f acquisition, a road 
provided access to a Quonset hut on Parcel A, running through the southern portion of 
Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. The Quonset hut is located near the 
border of Parcel A and Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an 
approach (the original approach) that turned slrarply north from the access road, which runs east 
to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to 
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road 
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each 
direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Alters constructed a new approach (the curved approach), 
which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop 
Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis, 
over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinsltis filing a lawsuit. The 
Pepli~lskiiAkers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinsltis sold their property, including Parcel A, 
to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining 
Parcel B, to the Whites. 
In January 2002, the Akers bloclted Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access 
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes 
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property i11 Parcel A. Appellants then brought 
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to 
otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and 
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by 
Appellants. 
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence. 
The district court bifurcated the trial proceedings. After thc first phase of the trial, the district 
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Appellants had an express 
easement 12.2 feet in width across the Alters' property in Government Lot 2. The district court 
determined that the express easement began at Millsap Loop Road, ran through the original 
approach rather than the curved approach, and tracked the southern boundary of Government Lo1 
2, terminating at the western boundary of illai parcel aiid did not eilttr into the Alters' property in 
Parcel B. The district court concluded that Appellants had failed t o  establish a prescriptive 
easement or an implied easement arising from prior use. The district court further concluded that 
Appellants had trespassed and unreasonably interfered with the Akers' use of their property, with 
damages to be determined in the second phase of the trial. 
Before the damages portion of the trial, the district court personally viewed the property 
in dispute in the company of counsel for the parties. After the second phase of the trial, the 
district court awarded the Akers compensatory damages arising from Appellants' trespass in the 
amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. 5 6-202 for a total of $51,008.55, to 
he paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded $10,000 in 
compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by 
Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers 
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of 
$30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Alters, to 
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06. 
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers 
I. This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a 
determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an 
easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and 
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand 
regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights. 
011 remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied 
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment 
of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding 
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a 
second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were 
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was 
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found 
the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned 
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees 
from Akers i, and awarded the kiters their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellanis tinieiy 
appealed from the district court's order on remand. 
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review oE a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports 
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger 
v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (citing Alumef v. Bear Lake 
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial 
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment 
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(1990)). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) 
(citing Canzp v. Easi Fo'ovk Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); 
Bramuiell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); 1.R.C.P 
52(a)). If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998)). This Court will 
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Rai~som, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d 
at 4 (citing Bruntwell, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the 
question of damages will not be set aside when based upoil substantial and competent evidence. 
Trilogy Network Sys., inc, v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 11 19, 1121 (2007) (citing 
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 
665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983)). 
111. ANALYSIS 
The parties ask that we resolve all remaining issues in the case without f~~r ther  remand. 
We are unable to fulfill their requests. We affirm the district court's decision concluding that 
Appellants do not hold an easement implied from prior use across the Akers' property. We also 
affirm the district court's finding that Appellants hold a prescriptive easement across 
Government Lot 2 totaling 12.2 feet in width that is coextensive with the scope and location of 
Appellants' express easement. I-Iowever, we conclude that the district cou~.t's finding concerning 
the location of Appeiiants' prescriptive easement across Parcel I3 is not supported by siibstantia: 
and competent evidence and we vacate this finding and remand the issue to the district court. 
We also vacate and remand the district court's award of damages in favor of the Akers for 
further determination consistent with the district court's conclusions concerning Appellants' 
easement rights on remand. 
Appellants argue that (1) the district court's Order on Remand did not comply with 
I.R.C.P. 52(a); (2) the district court erred when it concluded that Appellants do not have an 
easement by implication across the Akers' real property; (3) the district court erred when it found 
that Appellants' prescriptive easement is coextensive. with  ellant ants' expressed easement 
across Government Lot 2 and the prescriptive easement turns immediately to the south upon 
turning into Parcel B; (4) the district court erred when it awarded the Akers compensatory and 
punitive damages for trespass and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) the district 
court erred when it awarded the Akers attorney fees and costs below. We address these 
arguments in turn. 
A. Although the district court's Order on Remand failed to comply with the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a), it is sufficient to permit appellate review. 
Appellants argue that the district court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on remand in accordance with I.R.C.P. 52(a). Rather than remanding this case, Appellants 
ask to resolve their claims of easement because the relevant facts and conclusions to be drawn 
therefrom are clear and obvious in the record. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in relevant part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without ajury or with an advisoly jury, 
the corn shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment . . . . A written 
memoraildum decision issued by the court may constitute the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law only if the decision expressly so states or iS it is thereafter 
adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law by order ofthe court. 
The district court issued a written memorandum decision that did not expressly state that 
the decision constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither did the district court 
adopt the memorandum decision as its findings of fact and conclusions of law by order. 
Accordingly, the Order on Remand did not comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry. 
" CC ,..A:-,. The purpose of the underlying rule is to a~iord  the appeliate couri a clear undcrstd I ~ u , , , ~  
of the basis of the trial court's decision, so that it might be determined whether the trial court 
applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment." Pope v .  
Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982) (citing Perry Plumbing 
Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494,497, 531 P.2d 584, 587 (1975)). To that end, the findings required 
by Rule 52(a) should be clear, coherent, and complete while avoiding an unnecessary review of 
the evidence. Browning 1,. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6 ,  14, 995 P.2d 351, 359 (2000). 
We considered the effect of a trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 52(a) in I'etition ofSteve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986). In that case, the 
appellant argued that a magistrate's order must be reversed because the memorandum opinion 
did not expressly state it constitutes findings of fact and conclusions of law. We rejected this 
argument, stating: 
[Wle agree with and affirm the district court who noted: "This court concludes 
that it is abundantly clear from a reading of the entire memorandum and order 
what facts the magistrate accepted and what law he acted upon." The decision of 
[the magistrate] permits meaningful appellate review, and while perhaps 
technically violative of I.R.C.P. 52(a), such does not require a remand in this case. 
Accord Matter ofndoption of Baby Girl Chance, 609 P.2d 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1980). 
Id. at 292, 723 P.2d at 836. This concIusion is completely consistent with the admonition that 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P. l(a). Although we expect 
the trial courts of this state to comply with our rules of procedure, the interests identified in 
I.R.C.P. l(a) would not be served if we were to rigidly interpret I.R.C.P. 52(a) as requiring that a 
trial court's decision must bc vacated and remanded solely because of the failure to comply with 
the requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
In the instant case, the district court's Order on Remand clearly articulates the facts the 
district court accepted and the law that it applied. Our instructions on remand in Akers I directed 
the district court to make additional findings and conclusions regarding the Appellants' claims of 
an implied easement from prior use and prescriptive easement. As to the existence of an 
easement implied from prior use, the district court noted that our decision in Akers I required the 
district court to determine whether, at the time of the severance of the dominant and servient 
estates, there was an easement across the servient estate that was reasonably necessary to the 
proper enjoyment of i'ne ciorninani estate. Tlie district court found that, at thc timc of the 
severance of the dominant and servient estates, a "back way" provided access to the dominant 
estate. Therefore, the district court found that an implied easement across the servient estate was 
not reasonably necessary and concluded that Appellants did not hold an easement implied by 
prior use across the Akers' property. 
With regard to Appellants' claim of a prescriptive easement, the district court noted that 
our decision in Akevs I held that Appellants were entitled to a presumption of adverse use and the 
relevant time period the district court was to examine on remand was from 1966 to 1980. The 
district court concluded that Appellants had a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2 
that was coextensive with their express easement that continued into Parcel B and turned 
immediately south into Appellants' property. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's 
Order on Remand affords us a clear understanding of the basis of the district court's decision. 
B. The district court did not err when it found that Appellants do not have an 
easement by implication across the Akers' property. 
In Akers I, we limited the scope of the remand to one of thee  elements needed to 
establish an implied easement from prior use. 142 Idaho at 301, 127 P.3d at 204. In order to 
prove the existence of an implied easement by prior use, a party must show: (1) unity of title or 
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous 
use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be 
permanent; and (3) that the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of 
the dominant estate. Id. In Akers I, we held that Appellants had satisfied the first two elements 
of an easement implied from prior use. Id. at 302, 127 P.3d at 205. However we remanded the 
case due to the lack of findings necessary for the resolution of the question whether in 1966, 
when the dominant estate was separated from the servient estate, use of the access road through 
Parcel B was "reasonably necessary" to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Id 
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it found that the access road across the 
Akers' property was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of Appellants' property. 
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it found that a back way provided sufficient 
alternative access to the property in 1966, and therefore the access road across Government Lot 2 
was not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
"'[Rleasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for an 
easement implied by necessity."' Beach Late~a: 8'atei. L'seis Ass';? -3, Har~"ison, 142 Idaho 500, 
605, 130 P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (quoting Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362, 
368 (1999)). Because an implied easement from prior use arises at the time of severance, the 
issue of reasonable necessity is based upon the circumstances that existed at that time. Akers I, 
142 Idaho at 302, 127 P.3d at 205 (citing Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367). When 
deciding the issue of reasonable necessity, the court should "balance the relative situations pro 
and con, as to the respective convenience, inconvenience, costs and all other pertinent, connected 
facts." Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 (1950) (citations omitted). 
Although Eisenbarth involved a private condemnation action under I.C. 5 7-701(5), its analysis 
of reasonable necessity required for the private condemnation of a road is also applicable to the 
reasonable necessity required for an implied easement by prior use. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 
Idaho 635,639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 13.3 (2006). 
The district court found that Appellants "failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that [a] 'back way' did not exist back in 1966" that provided sufficient alternative 
access to the dominant estate. The district court found that, in 1966, Appellants' property was 
used for agricultural purposes. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district 
court's conclusion that the back way existed in 1966. First, the district court relied on the 
testimony of Reynolds, who testified that the back way was an old road. Reynolds did not testify 
as to how old the road was, however, he did indicate the road was in existence at the time he was 
six years old. When he testified on September 9, 2002, Reynolds was 63 years old, meaning he 
was six years old in 1945. Reynolds's testimony indicates that the back way existed prior to the 
separation of the dominant and servient estates in 1966. The district court also found that the 
back way was depicted on a United States Geological Smvey topographic map from 1901. 
Appellants argue that the testimony of William A. Millsap, whose father was the 
Appellants' predecessor in interest, proves that the back way did not exist in 1966. During 
William Millsap's testimony, Appellants' counsel asked whether there was access to t11e property 
by means other than the access road running through the Akers' property. William Millsap 
answered: "Uh, no, not tlzat we ever used." (emphasis added). Similarly, Appellants argue the 
testimony of Richard Peplinski, whose father was also the Appellants' predecessor in interest, 
proves that the back way did not exist in 1966. Appellants' counsel asked Peplinski: "Other than 
this access road that was there when you purchased - when your dad purchased the property, was 
lhere any other road jiou used lo access the 150 acres?" (emphasis added). Richarc! Peplinski 
answered "No." 
The district court examined the testimony of both William Millsap and Richard Peplinski 
and found that their testimony implied that the back way existed hut it was not used by either of 
the witnesses' fathers to access the dominant estate. We conclude that there was substantial 
evidence supporting the district court's finding that the back way existed at the time of the 
separation of the dominant and servient estates in 1966. When deciding the issue of reasonable 
necessity, it is the province of the trial court to balance the respective convenience, 
inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts. Appellants have not persuaded us that the trial 
court's conclusion should be overturned on appeal. 
C. The district court's findings of fact regarding the scope and location of the 
prescriptive easement are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
The district court found that Appellants' prescriptive easement was coextensive in scope 
and location with Appellants' express easement across Government Lot 2. The district court also 
found that the prescriptive easement turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B. 
Appellants argue that they hold a prescriptive easement over the entire length of the access road 
in Government Lot 2, including the curved approach. Appellants also argue that the prescriptive 
easement does not turn immediately south upon entering Parcel B and that t l ~ e  district court 
improperly limited the width of the prescriptive easement to 12.2 feet. 
1. The district court did not err when it found that the location of Appellants' 
prescriptive easement across the Akers' property was coextensive with the 
express easement in Government Lot 2. 
Appellants argue that the curved approach is part of their prescriptive easement across 
Government Lot 2. Thc district court found that Appellants' prescriptive easement is 
coextensive i11 scope with Appellants' express easement, which does not include the curved 
approach. We conclude that Appellants' argument regarding the curved approach is not properly 
before this Court on appeal. 
Our remand in Alters 1 directed the district court to determine whether a prescriptive 
easement across Government Lot 2 was acquired during the time between the severance of the 
dominant and servient estates in 1966 and when the Alters purchased the their property in 1980. 
The Akers did not construct the curved approach until 1982. Because the Akers constructed the 
curved approach after they had purchased their property, the question whether a prescriptive 
easement arosc across t i~c  curved apploach was outside the scope of thc rcmand. Thcrcfore, v;e 
decline to address this argument on appeal. 
2. The district court erred when it found that Appellants' prescriptive easement 
turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B. 
Appellants argue that thcir prescriptive easement does not turn immediately south upon 
entering Parcel B, and instead extends further to the west around a hill before turning south onto 
Appeliants' prope~ly. The district court found that the access road on Parcel B, prior to 1980, 
turned south immediately after entering Parcel B From Government Lot 2. The district court 
included an attached exhibit to its amended judgment that illustrated the location of Appellants' 
prescriptive easement on Parcel B. After the prescriptive easement crossed the boundary of 
Government Lot 2 into Parcel B, the exhibit indicates that the easement turns 90 degrees to the 
south and enters Appellants' property. However, this finding is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
The district court stated that it relied upon a number of exhibits when it concluded that 
Appellants' easement turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B, including Defendants' 
Exhibits 42 and 44. However, these exhibits, which are aerial photographs of the relevant 
property, indicate that the access road historically made a more gradual turn resembling a 
shepherd's crook rather than a 90-degree turn. Defendant's Exhibit 41, an aerial pholograph 
from 1978 also shows that the access road made a gradual turn through Parcel B before entering 
Parcel A. Perhaps most telling is Plaintiffs Exhibit 253, which is a photograph of the shared 
boundaly between Government Lot 2, Parcel B, and Parcel A, and the Quonset hut on Parcel A. 
While the photograph was taken in 2003 (well after the prescriptive easement was established 
prior to 1980), it is nonetheless informative. The photograph depicts a large hill to the south of 
the access road, which the access road gradually curves around. We recognize that the 
uncontroverted evidence showed that the Akers permitted Peplinski to extend the access road 
further to the west in Parcel B after the Akers purchased the property. I-Iowever, the photograp11 
does not support a finding that the access road previously turned 90 degrees to the south 
traveling straight up a steep hill in order to access Parcel A, as would be required if the access 
road had immediately turned 90 degrees upon entering Parcel B. In light of this photographic 
evidence, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence supporting the district court's 
conclusion as to the location of Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. This issue must 
he remanded to the disirici court for addiiionai fact finding coiisisieni with this opinion. 
3. The' district court did not err when it found that the scope of Appellants' 
prescriptive easement across the Akers' property was limited to a width of 12.2 
feet. 
Appellants argue that the scope of the prescriptive easement is at least 25 feet in width, 
including ditches and shoulders. Appellants argue that their predecessors in interest originally 
used the prescriptive easement for agricultural purposes and operated farming equipment in 
excess of 20 feet in width on the access road. The district court concluded that the scope of 
Appellants' prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width. 
The district court examined a number of exhibits and personally viewed the property 
during the trial before concluding that the scope of the prescriptive easement was limited to a 
width of 12.2 feet. Thc district court based its finding of fact on Plaintiffs' exhibits 304 and 305. 
These exhibits depict a portion of the access road without ditches or shoulders on either side. 
The district court also considered the testimony of W.L. Millsap and Reynolds when it 
considered the width of Appellants' prescriptive easement. The district court found, based on its 
viewing of the property and the record, that the width of the traveled portion of the access road 
was 12.2 feet. We conclude that the district court's finding is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and affirm the district court's decision. 
D. The damages award and award of attorney fees and costs must be vacated. 
As we held in Akers I, the question of whether and to what degree Appellants' conduct 
constituted trespass on the Akers' property is intertwined with the question of the scope and 
boundaries of Appellants' easement rights. Akers I, 142 Idaho at 304, 127 P.3d at 207. Because 
the district court must determine the locatioll of Appellants' pvescriptive easement in Parcel B on 
remand, we vacate the district court's award of damages below based upon trespass. 
Similarly, we also vacate the district court's award of damages to Sherrie Akers for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court awarded Sherrie Akers $10,000 for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which Appellants are jointly and severally liable. 
To support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a party must prove a breach of a 
recognized leeal dutv. Nation v. State. Deut. ofCorr..  144 Idaho 177. 191. 158 P.3d 953. 967 
(2007). In the instant case, the district court predicated the award of damages for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress on Appellants' malicious behavior while trespassing on the 
Akers' property. As we indicated in A k e ~ r  I, the question of damages flowing from Appellants' 
coilduct is inseparable fioiii considerakx of Appellants' easement rights. A!cc,-s I, 142 Ida!:o at 
304, 127 P.3d at 207. Without a determination of Appellants' easement rights, it is impossible to 
determine the scope of Appellants' trespass. Therefore, we vacate the district court's award of 
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress and remand the issue for further 
determination after the district court determines Appellants' easement rights. For the same 
reason, we vacate the district court's award of punitive damages in favor of the Akers. 
For the same reasons that we vacate the district court's damage awards, we vacate the 
district court's award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers. 
E. Costs and Attorney Pees on Appeal 
Both the Akers and Appellants request an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. In 
light of the mixed result in this case, we conclude that there is no prevailing party on appeal. 
Therefore, we decline to award costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court's judgment that Appellants do not have an implied easement 
by prior use and that Appellants' prescriptive easement is 12.2 feet in width. We vacate the 
district court's judgment as to the location of the prescriptive easement in Parcel B, the award of 
damages, and the award of attorney fees and costs. We remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. We do not award attorney fees or costs on appeal. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICIC, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tem TROUT 
CONCUR. 
